

Double Helix

Master of Philosophy (M.Phil.) Papers

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Circa 1974

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On the basis of these papers I was allowed to transfer from M.Phil. to Ph.D. studies. Some of these papers were started on a M.Sc. course prior to transfer to M.Phil. This is a scan of the papers submitted to Professor David Martin, Sociology Department. Footnotes, except for part one, are lost. This paper has been OCRed 070603 and the corrected file is available as DHA01aN.doc where NN is a number. After this I went on to complete a Ph.D dissertation called The Structure of Theoretical Systems in relation to Emergence which was accepted 1982 for award of the degree. Subsequently I wrote Wild Software Metasystems, The Fragmentation of Being and the Path beyond the Void, Reflexive Autopoietic Systems Theory, and many other books and papers. See also http://works.bepress.com/kent_palmer. These major works are also available on scribd.com. List of all digital works is at http://archonic.net/kdp_ouvre_size04.pdf

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SECTION II

In the last section the difference between objectification which was the result of Peirce-Lacan-Saussures' mere categorization and an analysis introducing logical types shown to us by Monod and Munz was briefly discussed. Objectification by means of its henchmen Empiricism and Intellectualism (Rationalism) not only destroys time but also space through the devaluation of perspective and depth. Beyond this it distorts our whole notion of what the world is like as lived and surreptitiously (as Husserl says) is substituted for the life world.¹ In this section we will again be dealing with theories which merely categorize when conceived outside a framework of logical types. However, here we will see these theories fitted-in to a scheme of logical types. Now this will bring to the fore a fundamental criticism of these theories. The fact is that theories which merely categorize seem to stand up until considered from the perspective of logical types. Then their fundamental flaws appear and they are shown up for the Imaginary relationships they really are. They will be shown to be haunted by the ghost of their merely objective genesis. Now what lies in obscurity will come to the fore; that objective (Imaginary) descriptive analysis and Phenomenological description go hand in hand. In order for a phenomenological description of the Life world to be presented, one must first present a dualistic, objective, and Imaginary description. When the Imaginary "objective" description is isolated from the phenomenal description its genesis is distorted in such a way that it is haunted by the ghost of the phenomenological description which is its necessary antithesis. There can be no meaningful 'phenomenological description' antithesis without an Imaginary Ground laid first of objective


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description. However on the other hand objective description may be conceived without Phenomenal description guiding its genesis because objectivity is the thesis which brings the necessity of phenomenal description to light. In this section we shall see how merely categorical descriptions are haunted by phenomenological description when set in a framework of logical types. Here, it will be shown how the Helix of logical types may provide a fundamental criticism of merely categorical systems and thought.

Necessarily only a sketch will be presented here of the interrelations between the various theories mentioned. To defend, support fully, and explore all the implications of my more or less arbitrary linking of these gentlemens' theories in this way would take another paper itself. This sketch only intends to show how the double helix may be used as a critical tool. What is important is that it is through such an arbitrary stacking of theories that the form of the double helix was given to me. Now through the precise definition of that form, in turning it back on those theories which were the means of its appearance, we find that these theories themselves are unequal to the job of containing the double helix form. This reveals the importance the double helix over and above any specific phenomena it is used to describe.

Figure I

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I. A- awareness
 *M- memory
 Bh- behavior

II. TR- Topical Relevance
 *IR- Interpretational Relevance
 MR- Motivational Relevance

III. R- Rede (talk)
 *V- Verstehen (understanding)
 B- Befindlichkeit (foundedness)(facticity)

IV. TI- Transcendental Intersubjectivity
 (understand talk)
 *LW- Life World (fact talk)
 TE- Transcendental Ego (understand fact)

V. OS- Objective Science (TI + LW)
 *P- Phenomenal Knowledge (TE + LW)
 O- Origin beyond all dichotomies & beyond
 the Life World

VI. W- World teleology through
 Reversibility
 *L- Language, sedimented;
 problem solving
 S- Speaking; creative origination

* indicates mediation


The figure on the previous page will give some idea of where we intend going in brief while we begin our sketch at the bottom (triangle I) with G. H. Mead and his definition of the "primitive situation".² This is as close as Mead gets to any real philosophical grounding of his Social Psychology. He presents it as the bare minimum requirements for the development of symbols and significant symbols and through them Society, Generalized Other, Self and Mind. An analysis of this situation in which two organisms confront one another in a conversation of gestures reveals that each of them must be capable of awareness, behavior and memory. All other human qualities, given these apriori elements, may arise out of the interaction itself through its independent course and unique evolution. Here it will be useful to point out, as Merleau Ponty³ has demonstrated, Perception (Awareness) and Behavior are in fact the same thing. Perception consists in an orientation of the body. The movement of the eye toward an object and the perception of that object are the same. The hand that grasps also feels. This distinction between perception and behavior for Mead is really then a distinction between one's Percepto-Kinesthesia for oneself and one's Percepto-Kinesthesia for others.⁴ It is this hidden Imaginary distinction which gives rise to the blind spot in Mead's Social Psychology between "I" and "Me" in the subject's experience of his action. This blind-spot is, as Merleau Ponty has shown, a fallacy made necessary by the attempt to describe the human body/subjects' being-in-the-world, present at a situation, in "objective" terms.⁵ The truth is that in lived experience there is no blind spot between the "I" and "Me", between act and intent. Percepto-Kinesthesia is a unity beyond any intent or action. The blind spot is only an analytic

device designed to allow for objectivity. It is as Bateson says,⁶ an arbitrary slash drawn across the analogue nature of lived experience. Merleau Ponty has shown us that no such absolute blindspot or unconsciousness is possible.⁷ What is unconscious is never totally so. It is in fact precisely what is present but held at a distance and in the case of Repression it is known precisely to the extent it is ignored or avoided. We may say that Percepto-Kinesthesia might have more fruitfully defined in Suzanne Langer's terms of Felt as impact (Perception) and Felt as action (Behavior).⁸ This is the real dichotomy of which Percepto-Kinesthesia makes us aware. However by reducing Awareness and Behavior to this more essential dichotomy we would be leaving out the essential element of our series. The blind spot is necessary inasmuch as it represents intersubjectivity in disguise as objectivity. However, as long as we know that the lacune is a positive element we may then move to express the essential dichotomy in Langer's terms.

Moving on then we may say further that Percepto-Kinesthesia (which allows feeling of impact and outward action) and the blind spot constitute a presence and an absence which are together a PRESENCE. This PRESENCE is in turn an Immanence over against the Transcendence of memory.⁹ Memory is the mediator between felt as impact and felt as action. It is the link which allows us to jump over the gap in objective description. This memory however, like awareness and behavior is an objective concept which distorts our primordial experience of Time and Memory. The future is collapsed into the past which in turn is withdrawn into a mere re-presentation formed in the present. Past and future lose their lived

quality by being closed off from the person whose memories they are. The original experience of time as the upsurge of our subjectivity as a being in the world where Past and Future co-exist in the present is lost all together. We are forced to recognize that Memory too is really indistinguishable from Percepto-Kinesthesia inasmuch as every movement and perception is based on those it follows and those to come. What is revealed then is a single unity of the body/subject's being-in-the-world as the upsurge is time which is split up into a crude trichotomy as if by a South American Butcher with no knowledge of anatomy. We are witness then to the emergence of our double helix out of a foundation of lived experience. Instead of taking that experience with it; instead of trying to lie along the contours of that experience; it separates itself from phenomenal experience and thereby creates only Imaginary dichotomies which lie hidden in the heart of the double helix. What we see hidden in the lacuna is the positive presence of self-other Imaginary dichotomy which will plague the whole structure of this double helix precisely because this ambiguity is not brought out into the light and shown to be implied in the structure of thought.

FIGURE 2



The lacuna covers up the origin of the helix which is the unity of the body/subject as the advent of time in presence-at-the-world. Memory cannot effect any real mediation across the barrier of the gap because instead of allowing time into the system as it seems to want to do, it closes time out.

The Antithesis to Mead's triangle is derived in three simultaneous syntheses from it, giving us Schutz's three relevances:


$$\begin{array}{lcl} \text{Awareness} & + & \text{Memory} \\ \text{Behavior} & + & \text{Memory} \\ \text{Behavior} & + & \text{Awareness} \end{array} \begin{array}{l} = \text{Topical Relevance} \\ = \text{Motivational Relevance} \\ = \text{Interpretational Relevance} \end{array}$$

Here we have entered a wholly Imaginary system of thought untempered by the knowledge of primodial experience before any words or reflections. What is felt as impact in interaction with objective memory yields what is to us of Topical Relevance. Our objective behavior in conjunction with Memory yields what is of Motivational Relevance. Schutz's own categories when analyzed critically are only a little more subtle than that, inasmuch as his phenomenological description splits the realm of Action from that of perception. It is through reflection that in each of these realms relevances are generated. Interpretational Relevance on the other hand presents us with a tricky problem. Interpretational Relevance is the mediator between Topical and Motivational Relevances. Now the blind spot in Schutz's system occurs between Reflection and Perception/Action. Although he separates Perception and Action for analysis sake they are really structurally the same. That is, he posits that there are fields of pure perception and pure behavior which are unstructured. It is when reflection comes to play on these that meaning is given and they are structured. There is a gap between pure perception and action and reflection proper. Now motivational relevance and

topical relevance are automatic responses to given stimuli whereas Interpretational Relevance on the other hand directs reflection itself. Thus topical and motivational relevance appear to a sort of automatic memory which is activated whenever the appropriate sense or action structure appears on the horizon. What is of Interpretational relevance however is not tied to this sort of automatic memory. In fact it is through Interpretational Relevance that reflection proper builds up new structures to register in the automatic memory. Interpretational relevance is the active search of reflection for what is necessary to build up new structures of Topical and Motivational Relevances. This active search must occur in the presence of Behavior and Awareness. It is Reflections very act of pilgrimage to the fecund plenum of present Behavior and Perception (Awareness) without its prejudices of already acquired structures of Topical and Motivational Relevance. It shows us that reflection is distinguished from the objective memory of Mead and is in fact the source of those memories.

FIGURE 3

Break up of original unity



The lacuna has turned 90° and followed us upward in our helix. Here the lacuna hides, or rather is, the dichotomy between Reflection and Pure Behavior and Pure Perception. This distinction is Schutz's own attempt to unite the un-unitable opposites of pure unity and pure heterogeneity.

At the next level we find Heidegger's holy triune with the help of three simultaneous syntheses:

$$\begin{array}{lcl} \text{TR} & + & \text{IR} = \text{ Befindlichkeit } & (\text{facticity of thrownness}) \\ \text{MR} & + & \text{IR} = \text{ Verstehen } & (\text{understanding}) \\ \text{MR} & + & \text{TR} = \text{ Rede } & (\text{talk}) \end{array}$$

At this point the derivation is very complex and just as doubtful but briefly what is topically relevant to perception in connection with the searching of reflection (IR) yields up knowledge of the facticity of his being to the subject. On the other hand what is motivationally relevant, that is, what attracts the attention of the subject through what he finds himself doing, through the intervention of searching reflection leads to understanding. It must here be remembered that understanding is closely related to the nature of equipment building for Heidegger. Rede or talk is that to which the subject is most "care-fully" oriented in an attempt to de-throw himself. It is what primordially attracts his motivational and topical interest and in doing so manipulates his being. Understanding is the mediator between the subject's (Dasein's) realization of his facticity of thrownness and on the other hand this desire for the illusion that he can de-throw himself by losing himself in The They.

This is really the most complex of all the levels of our sample double helix, because Heidegger's philosophy takes the time to go all the way down to uncover the origin from which we departed. Here it is only necessary to

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uncover the lacuna which renders that origin false. I have described the levels of Heidegger's philosophy by which he descends to that origin in my second MSc paper. Sufficient to say here that Heidegger puts his ultimate value on separating his dasein from all influences of the They, that is on total individuation. To find what is authentically daseins and not one iota of which can be claimed by the They Heidegger, must appeal to death as the only thing which is uniquely untainted by the They. This analysis is of supreme importance in that conversely we discover just how far Intersubjectivity penetrates to the core of the individual. Only in his not being can the individual say This is mine alone. However, on the other hand if we agree with Merleau-Ponty that ultimately the subject does not experience either his birth or death we may realize quickly that our subject cannot really even claim death as his alone.¹¹ Heidegger would like to provide his subject with death in life in order to make up for this lack. This, the stage of Don't care, is an experience of an eternity or timeless moment in which one transcends through the cares of the world. It must be realized along with Merleau-Ponty that this eternity is really the resolute upsurge of time in the world.¹² It is a positive, not a negative state. We may then see, in short, that in Heidegger's lacuna is a subject whose individuality is posited but is ungraspable. Heidegger reveals in the clearest manner what Merleau-Ponty quotes so often from Husserl that "Transcendental subjectivity is intersubjectivity".¹³ In other words, there is not one bit of the individual which may be called authentically his alone. In his attempt to reach for some ultimate particle deep within the core of dasein which is authentically purely his alone Heidegger has proved once and for all the impossibility

of the venture. The biological vehicle, Dasein's body, is given to him by the intersubjective "Totum".¹⁴ Beyond that this body is transformed into a body/subject through its interaction within the overall system of the intersubjective community. All that might be said to be uniquely and authentically any one individual's is perhaps a certain ephemeral style of being-in-the-world which derives from that individual's particular status and place within the world and the intersubjective community. However, even this ephemeral style is not Dasein's because it can only be apprehended by another. Dasein can apprehend the style of the being of the world but not that of himself present-at-the-world. This philosophical discovery that, "Transcendental Subjectivity is intersubjectivity", is not just a revolutionary development in the history of philosophical tradition, but it is also of tremendous import for Sociology. It points out the philosophical significance of Sociology. However, it is not Sociology as an objective science which becomes significant here but on the contrary a genetic sociology of intersubjectivity. That is a sociology on the hither side of the emergence of any objective dichotomies: a sociology of the origin of the intersubjective and the subjective) and their advent into the world which is undertaken anew at each moment in human history. This is the origin from which arise all social institutions.

The next stage (iv) we attribute to Husserl as the antithesis to Heidegger's system. Where Heidegger works from the "they" down to the inner core of Dasein by peeling away the layers, Husserl, on the contrary, assumes the core and builds outward from there. Our three simultaneous syntheses are these:

R + V	---	(understand talk)	---	TRANSCENDENTAL INTERSUBJECTIVITY
B + R	---	(fact talk)	---	LIFE WORLD
B + V	---	(understand fact)	---	TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECTIVITY

The derivation is simple. The understanding which operates through talk is transcendental intersubjectivity as a unity. On the other hand the understanding which is the facticity of thrownness is transcendental subjectivity. The realm in which the facticity of thrownness (which is the individual) and talk (the They) come together is the Life World of Husserl's later works. This is where the two mutually exclusive assumptions are assumed to coincide. The lacuna shows itself at this level. Here the subject and the They have merged in their full reification to form an imaginary paradox. The two assumptions are mutually exclusive yet they must be a unity in the Life World. We see how the lacuna, which has haunted our helix from its inception, has now revealed itself fully as an emergent paradox. The lacuna at first was merely the implicit assumption of objectivity in the formation of our categories at level I. It has followed us through our formulation of levels II and III to now reveal itself fully. The implicit original assumption of objectivity was actually the assumption of Intersubjectivity. At level I we thought we were with Mead describing one individual's capacities. In fact we find that implicitly one subject was confronting intersubjectivity in the guise of objectivity. We now fully can appreciate Fuller's remark that the double helix is the sign of two interacting events. Our two interacting events here are the reified imaginary elements of the subjective/intersubjective dichotomy.


The Life World of Lacan's terms is a symbolic realm of analogue exchange of distinctions. The dichotomization into the duality of subjective/objective

(implicitly intersubjective) is just an imaginary distortion of this interchange. We know that this must be true, but having made this implicit assumption of the dichotomy from the first we are left now at this late date only with the alternative of unassuming our hitherto taken for granted assumption. That "Transcendental Subjectivity is intersubjectivity" . . . is beyond a doubt precisely because of the appearance of the paradox of the life world. In order to extract ourselves from the paradox we must go back and rethink our thoughts from the beginning, attempting to avoid the implicit assumptions we made at the beginning which have been brought to light by the development of our thought. Husserl's level in our sample double helix presents us in Bateson's¹⁶ terms a classic double bind situation when that level is presented alone outside the context of the series. When it is presented outside the series there is no escape from the double bind as there exists in the series when one may always move to the next meta-level to escape the schizoid situation of the double bind. The next level on which it is possible to meta-communicate about the double bind situation on level IV we shall designate as Merleau-Ponty's level. We arrive there by three simultaneous syntheses:

TI under- stand talk	+	LW fact talk	\Rightarrow alienating objective scientific description
TE under- stand fact	+	LW fact talk	\Rightarrow phenomenal description
TE under- stand fact	+	TI under- stand talk	\Rightarrow origin beyond all dichotomies

The role of the They (TI) in the Life World is to create alienating, objective scientific knowledge which is in fact intersubjective knowledge in a reified form. On the other hand Dasein through self-reliance and doubt may provide a phenomenal description of the Life World. Following Merleau-Ponty's epistemology we may say that beyond this dichotomy there is an origin beyond all dichotomies which is the ground upon which the dichotomy of phenomenal versus objective is founded. Merleau-Ponty's epistemology might look something like this. (see Figure 4) At least this is an extrapolation of what his epistemology might look like. Here levels A and B are actually taken from Heidegger's epistemology since as far as I know, Merleau-Ponty doesn't develop the implications of his thought to that extent. In his lifework he really only went as far as level C. But because of the closeness of Merleau-Ponty and Heideggers' philosophical aims I don't think this suggest is too outrageous.

FIGURE 4



Now, it is at this origin beyond all dichotomies that the true unity of TE and TI will be found. Meanwhile our lacuna which emerged fully as a paradox on level IV has taken finally a positive shape as a distorted mediation of the level V triangle. Instead of the origin mediating between phenomenal and objective as might be expected. In fact what we have is the phenomenal mediating between the Origin and the Objective. This indicates an estrangement between the origin and objectivity which we have already noted throughout this exposition. It is left, then, to the suppressed phenomenal description to try to pull together the imaginary separation between objectivity and the Origin which grounds it. The antithesis of level V, which defines the grounding of the inherent dichotomy between subjective and intersubjective which is the basis of the life world, is our last level to be considered: Level VI. This level VI goes beyond the grounding of the life world to the more fundamental question of the continual becoming, or the ever present advent, of the world as a teleological event in the Life World. We will identify this level with J. Monod and it is for us the most important level to be considered. It owes its origin again to three simultaneous syntheses.

Objective Science	+	Phenomenal Description	—	Teleology of WORLD through Reversability
Objective Science	+	Origin	—	Problem Solving "LANGUAGE"
Phenomenal Description	+	Origin	—	Creative Origination "SPEAKING"

Objective Science and phenomenal description are our means of knowing the world. They reveal in the world a teleological movement which, following the Monod system, is a purposive movement without any ultimate goal.

There is no master plan set at the beginning of the world but only an adaptive movement which gathers strength as it limits the possibilities of development through which chance elements it adopts. The origin must be understood on this level not just in terms of a grounding but in the further senses of founding and bestowal.¹⁷ Objective Science believes that this founding occurs through the slow sedimentation of new knowledge. On the other hand Phenomenal Description recognizes this origination in the advent of new paradigms. This dichotomy between Sedimentation (Problem Solving) on the one hand and the advent of Paradigms (creative origination) is very similar to Saussure's dichotomy language/speaking. From the point of view of Language, Speaking entails only random errors which build up to change the system. From the converse point of view of Speaking, Language is the distorting sedimentation of what is created originally in the existential act of speaking wherein essence and esistence are one.¹⁸ The origin, then, is not merely the ground of the Phenomenal and the Objective but is also the act of bestowal of order, which dichotomization represents, whose effects may be seen from the objective point of view in the sedimentation of all such acts. However, on the other hand, the origin seen from the phenomenal point of view represents a founding in the act of speaking (in the creative act) of a new paradigm or world view which creates a new plane of reality in the world.

Notice that this final triangle's form, with problem solving as the mediator, takes the precise form of Monod's theoretical system comprised of Chance/Teleonomic Filter/Necessity; wherein Chance=speaking, Teleonomic Filter=language, and Necessity=world teleology.

What happened to our lacuna? Has it disappeared? Or perhaps it has only sunk back into the woodwork of the helixes. The latter is more likely. It is in fact the exposure of this lacuna again that confronts any serious consideration of creativity. The question, is it enough to merely separate Speaking from Language; creative origination from Problem solving, as Merleau-Ponty has done in his works? We must in fact say that it is not enough and that there is still a more vital ground upon which origination itself is based which is hidden in the Monod formulation. This ground upon which origination is based is pointed out by Merleau-Ponty himself. This ground is reversibility. The lacuna at level VI is the implied presence as an absence of Reversibility.

What is reversibility and what does it tell us? Briefly reversibility is the ability of the Chiasm to appear in either one of two ways. It is the basic ambiguity of Existence. It is this reversibility which has been hidden by the lacuna all along. It is this reversibility upon which the origin beyond all dichotomies is grounded which in turn is the ground for the subject/object split. It is the advent of Being in the form of the ambiguous being-in-the-world of the body/subject. It will be our job in the rest of this paper to explore the implications of this fundamental reversibility for creativity which makes the Speaking Language dichotomy unacceptable. Which forces us to recognize the basic inadequacy of the problem solving versus paradigm creation distinction.

Before beginning the next section, one further point must be made which is that through the successive double syntheses there is a blending of whatever elements one begins ones analysis. Thus there is a threefold structure

in this double helix wherein original unity is broken up through analysis and then in successive stages re-synthesized. This is the very flaw which ruins the helix and gives rise to the lacuna. What we must do is provide a helix which through a balance of objective and phenomenal criticism does not owe its origin to the destruction and reconstitution of an original unity. Therefore, we have two goals:

A theory of creativity which goes beyond the Monod structure into the realm of reversibility.

A helix which does not destroy an original unity at its origination.