Making Sense of Meaning in Deleuze

From Hyper and Wild Being to Ultra Being

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Introduction

In this essay I will attempt to make sense of Deleuze. Deleuze writes about Sense in the Logic of Sense but the question arises as to how Deleuze himself makes sense. Part of his theory of sense is that there are two series that run parallel and then intersect in the sense making process, so we can ask what are these two series in the work of Deleuze himself. And clearly that would appear to be the difference between his historical work and his own free philosophizing works. In our course we have read the most difficult of the works of Deleuze which are in the series of his free philosophizing out of the history of philosophy rather than the works set within the history of philosophy. But in my desperation to understand the texts where he espouses his own philosophy makes sense within Deleuze’s theory of sense. He mentions in What is Philosophy? that for him Spinoza is the most prominent of philosophers of immanence, so that drove be back to read his book on Expressionism in philosophy of Spinoza. What is strange is that that book and the Leibniz book on the Fold are to my mind crystal clear and have a strange difference from the obscurity of the main texts of Deleuze that we have read from the other series where he philosophizes out of his own thought stream rather than through that of another philosopher. However these two methods of exploration, through the thought of another or out of his own thought stream are complementary and the explanation of many of the problems encountered when trying to understand what Deleuze is up to in his own thought stream which many times seems completely obscure. By following the hints of Deleuze himself, such as his calling out Spinoza as the prince of the immanent philosophers and then the realization that the Spinoza book is really about Leibniz as well which leads on to the later book on Spinoza helps to place the work of Deleuze himself in the context of the tradition of philosophy in a way that the books of his own thought stream do not. Buy the books of his own thought stream I am referring here to Difference and Repetition, Logic of Sense and What is Philosophy? which we have concentrated on in the course. To these we will just contrast the book on Expressionism in Spinoza (and Leibniz) and the book on the Fold concerning Leibniz. We will consider these as two series within the work of Deleuze himself and it is from these two series that we can begin to make sense of the philosophy of Deleuze which he has developed the books of his own philosophy as contrast to the exposition of that of others. However, what becomes clear is that Deleuze is twisting the thought of others to his own purposes within his historical books, and that they are an extension of his own thought stream. But what is so strange is the clarity of the historical works over against the non-historical works. It is this seeming clarity that

1 Martin Schwab, Philosophy of Deleuze Fall 2004 UCI
we wish to use to attempt to approach the obscurity of his own philosophy. At least this is the hope of this essay.

**Setting the Stage**

The first paper I have written for the course concerned the Logic of Sense. It attempted to look at the Jubilate Agno by Christopher Smart as an example of the theory of Sense of Deleuze. This text was used because it presents a dual series and the question was whether the other aspects of the Deluzian Theory of Sense would be found in the structure of the poem of this mad poet. Surprisingly these other surface features predicted by Deleuze were found. But then this threw me back to attempt to understand Deleuze better in order to discover whether there is anything beyond the surface comparison between the work of Smart and the theory of Deleuze. In other words I felt I needed to understand the roots of the theory of Sense that Deleuze proposes better in order to drive the comparison between the theory of Sense and the structure of sense in the poem of smart that arises out of madness. This is because to follow the Deluzian method what we want to be able to understand is the theory of sense of Christopher Smart as a singular and unique individual beyond the Deleuzian theory. But to do that it is necessary to understand the roots of the Deluzian theory itself as it unfolds from the Philosophical Tradition as Deleuze interprets it in his interpretation of Leibniz and Spinoza and their complementarity. A truly Deluzian interpretation must go beyond Deleuze to hear the voice of Smart. So we need to know not just whether Smart’s poem is representative of the theory of sense of Deleuze, but we need to track back to the root of the Theory of Deleuze and to go beyond that to the source of the repetition of the theory itself. Each instance of the theory that we invoke is a repetition. But from where does that theory speak, and how does it allow the singular in the work of Smart to speak in its own voice?

**Hidden Agenda**

My own reading of Deleuze stems from a hidden agenda. I have always seen Deleuze’s philosophy as an exemplar of Wild Being. What I had hoped to find in this course was further evidence that my interpretation of Deleuze as a philosopher attempting to build a philosophy within what Merleau-Ponty calls Wild Being was correct. However, my own appreciation of the meta-levels of Being have recently changed as I realized that a fifth meta-level of Being called Ultra Being exists, and as I have read Deleuze I have picked up hints that he has some understanding of Ultra Being and that his philosophy is not merely limited to the exemplification of Wild Being. So my agenda has changed during the course to understanding whether his philosophy represents only Wild Being, or whether it stretches into Ultra Being, or whether it bridges between the two types of Being at the upper reaches of the meta-levels of Being. In this paper I hope to struggle with this problem. I do not believe that I have any sure answers to the problem. I find the philosophy of Deleuze almost impenetrable and the little I have come to appreciate it has kept me coming back at it trying to understand it better, because the more I try to understand it the more I begin to understand the problems that I am working on in my own philosophical development. During this course I have written a book on Nondual Science and that book has been strongly influenced by my reading of Deleuze. I find Deleuze to be the most difficult philosopher I have tried to understand. Much of that difficulty comes from the fact that he is struggling with issues of how to build a philosophy that sheds light on Wild Being and Ultra Being which are the very issues that I myself have been struggling with as can be seen in my two papers on the “Metaphysics of Emergence.” It is amazing to me that Deleuze found these problems and has worked on them explicitly, problems at the very edge of what we are capable of thinking. I want to learn as much from his struggle with these problems as possible. What we can learn from Deleuze himself is that if we interpret a philosopher at a different meta-level of Being we get a completely different take on what that
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philosopher is talking about. So for instance in a previous workshop on Nietzsche we read both the interpretations of Heidegger and that of Deleuze. It was clear to me that Heidegger was interpreting Nietzsche as operating on the second meta-level of Being, by calling Will to Power as Will to Will. And it was clear also that Deleuze was trying to interpret Nietzsche as operating on the third meta-level of Being, i.e. the Will to Will to Will instead. Interpreting Nietzsche at the higher meta-level of Being causes the philosophy to be deeper but also much harder to understand. Similarly with Deleuze. I have previously interpreted him as only a philosopher of Wild Being, i.e. operating on the fourth meta-level of Being only. This is especially apparent in the Anti-Oedipus and Thousand Plateaus works with Guattari. But then when I read Difference and Repetition it did not completely fit this pattern and so I become confused about the issue. But in the mean time my own thought evolved until I understood that Ultra Being as the fifth meta-level of Being did exist, so when I read Deleuze from this perspective I saw hints that he was also dealing with Ultra Being and not clearly distinguishing between Wild Being and Ultra Being in his work. But this made his philosophy even more interesting to me because this is to me a whole new territory, and one which is almost impossible to understand, and if Deleuze is really dealing with this new territory, then it is understandable why his work is so hard to understand. But my question is How did he get there?, to this highest meta-level of Being which is itself unthinkable. It took me thirty years to arrive at the point where I could comprehend the possibility. For Deleuze to have gotten there first, if it is true, makes him a truly great philosopher, because he is not just one of those attempting to colonize Wild Being, the highest thinkable level, but has actually ventured beyond into the realm of the unthinkable, Ultra Being. This is significant because in my Ph.D. research I have been looking at the genealogy of the term Schema in the Western tradition, and what I have discovered is that the schema has the nature of Ultra Being, and I have also seen that the genuine emergent event has the nature of Ultra Being. Thus the schematization and emergence are joined in their rootedness in Ultra Being. So it is all the more important for me to understand this highest level of Being, because my first Ph.D. dissertation concerned the nature of emergence and the second one concerns the nature of schematization so that Ultra Being is the common denominator between these two terms, these two series, the series of emergent events and the series of schematic levels.

In my work on Emergence in my previous Ph.D dissertation I used the Theory of Logical Types of Russell and Whitehead from Principia Mathematica (cf Copi) to understand the various kinds of Being in Continental Philosophy. Once one begins to understand the kinds of Being in Continental Philosophy as meta-levels then what seems like a big mess becomes crystal clear. What I discovered was that a genuinely emergent event must pass thorough all the meta-levels of Being on its journey into the world, and that if an event does not pass into the world in this manner then it becomes an artificial emergence merely contributing to the nihilism that proliferates in the worldview. The genuinely emergent event clears the decks for a new ordering of the type that G.H. Mead calls the emergent event in The Philosophy of the Present. From that time up until very recently I thought that there were only four meta-levels of Being before one ran into Existence at the core of Being at the higher meta-levels, i.e. level five and above. It took me a long time to realize that Being itself exists as an existent at the fifth meta-level of Being and that this kind of Being was that of the genuinely emergent event at its core and also it turns out that this is the key kind of Being related to schematization.

I have explained the various kinds of Being and their relations in terms of Meta-levels in many of my works. Briefly there are four meta-levels of Being within Being itself and one meta-level that treats Being as an externality called Ultra Being. The lower kinds of being are Pure, Process, Hyper and Wild
Being. Pure Being is the Being of Parmenides and Process Being is the Being of Heraclitus. Heidegger in Being and Time claims these are equiprimordial and relates them to modes of being-in-the-world. Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of perception relates Pure Being as present-at-hand to *pointing*, and Process Being as ready-to-hand as *grasping*. But then this open’s Pandora’s box once we realize that there can be different modes of being-in-the-world, and the question becomes how many kinds of being-in-the-world are there. The answer is four. Beyond Pure Being and Process Being are two further types of being-in-the-world, which are Hyper Being and Wild Being. Heidegger discovers Hyper Being and calls it *Being* (crossed out). Merleau-Ponty at the end of the Phenomenology of Perception talks about the possibility of an expansion of being-in-the-world which I call the in-hand, and if being-in-the-world can expand then we expect that it can also contract to produce another modality I call out-of-hand. I relate these two further types of being-in-the-world to *bearing* and *encompassing*. Derrida and Levinas develop the first of these two further kinds of Being. Levinas talks about the stage where ethics and metaphysics collapse together as the mother and child bear each other in the intimate relation with the other. Derrida talks about difference as differing and deferring. But it is Merleau-Ponty in the unfinished The Visible and Invisible that develops the idea of Wild Being as being beyond the Hyper Dialectic of Heidegger’s Process Being and Nothingness of Sartre. It is this highest state of being-in-the-world that I have always believed that Deleuze was developing especially in the works on Anti-Oedipus and Thousand Plateaus with Guattari. My own previous belief was that Deleuze was departing from Merleau-Ponty in his work, exploring the realm of Wild Being, which is just this side of the unthinkable. But now I think I see that he is actually crossing over the break between the thinkable and the unthinkable and at times shows us Ultra Being in the process. Wild Being is chiasmic, i.e. is an interval which is reversible, and it is the closest you can come to thinking before you reach the frontier of the unthinkable. As an example if we say the portmanteau words *thoughtfeeling* and *feelingthought* then there is a difference in sense between them, this minimal difference in sense is the minimal sense that can appear outside the unthinkable within Being. But esoteric words on the other hand sometimes indicate the unthinkable itself. They form a sort of twilight language by which we indicate the unthinkable as the utterly bizarre. We have found both portmanteau words and esoteric words in the Jubilate Agno of Smart. But we also found the thing that allowed the two series to intersect, i.e. the singularity of the tongue, in the very first line of the poem. The tongue is the point of paradoxical overlap of the two series. But we must also consider the barrier between the two series which is the supra-rational, the difference between the two pieces of paper that the Let and For statements are written on. It is this discontinuity in the surface between the two prices of paper which is not a fold, that stands for the unthinkable itself. We see it in Old English poetry as the space down the center of the poem, such as in Beowulf. It is there from the beginning of the tradition of English Poetry implicitly, this supra-rational breach or discontinuity that becomes manifest in the two parallel pages of the mad poem of Smart. The break itself is unthinkable, but it is what separates the two series from the beginning and it is this barrier that is breached in the mixing of paradox and the paradoxical point as singularity that joins the two series. Notice that the tongue first appears on one page in the first line of the first Let series page. Then the tongue is repeated in various lines in the poem in different senses. But the discontinuity between the For and Let pages never alters when the paradoxical or allomorphic element appears within the series. This structural difference between the pages means we can in fact produce a chiasm by exchanging the two pages. We could exchange the For and Let pages across the divide between the pages and by this means produce a chiasm at the deepest structural level of the poem. Within the Let pages we could exchange the name of the man or house with
the animal to produce a chiasm within the let pages. Of course, we do not actually make these switches of order, but the order that is presented to us is done so in the context of the possibility of such a switch in order of presentation. We can always see the Let…For… in the context of the possibility of the For…Let… and we can always see the Individual Name….Animal Species in the context of the possibility of the Animal Species….Individual Name. That is to say in the context of the minimal difference in meaning that comes from the minimal syntax change this side of the unthinkable which we can only point to with the esoteric name. Thus the portmanteau word and the esoteric word are complements in a way not quite explained by Deleuze, but which we see in the context of the mad poem of Smart. The portmanteau word gives us the minimal meaning outside the unthinkable difference that appears in the discontinuity between the Let and For pages. But the esoteric words which are biblical names or animal names are ways of pointing toward the unthinkable itself from within the thinkable. This Individual Name and this Animal Species juxtaposed in rejoicing attempts to produce a singularity of meaning which is itself thinkable as men and animals but because of its esotericism becomes unthinkable in terms of juxtaposed names. Sense comes out of the difference between the order presented on the background of the opposite order implied at each level of the text. In this way the text attempts to indicate its sense from out of the nonsense of madness. But always the discontinuity of juxtaposition is there between pages and between names. The discontinuity that allows the juxtaposition of the elements is something supra-rational and not paradoxical. Understanding the approach of paradox to the supra-rational in key to the understanding of the transition from Wild Being to Ultra Being.

Let us consider the divided line of Plato. The divided line of Plato has two sides, that of ratio and that of doxa. The side of doxa is divided into appearance or opinion on the one hand and perception and grounded opinion on the other. The side of ratio is divided into the parts related to the representational and non-representational intelligibles. The limit of Doxa is the Paradoxical. The limit of the Ratio is the Supra-rational. The Paradoxical is the mixture of contradictories which when intensified gives us the absurd. The Supra-rational is the complete isolation between the contradictories yet their simultaneity without interference with each other. When we go from mathematics to seeing the source of the Good then we move from representable to non-representable intelligibles. The ultimate of the non-representable is the simultaneity of contradictories without conflict or interference. We see this in the difference between the For and Let pages in a pure form as the break in the surface of sense. It is not a fold but a discontinuous break across which juxtapositions of elements can occur as in the parallel For and Let statements. Let statements are in themselves as pure rejoicing while the For statements are for themselves as expressions of the poet in the face of that pure rejoicing.

As we move up the meta-levels of Being we hit a phase transition into existence at the fifth meta-level. I always thought this a sharp and pure transition, but recently realized that it was impure and tainted by Ultra Being, i.e. the externality of Being as the projection of intelligibility itself seen as an existent, i.e. being-out-of-the-world. Existence can be interpreted as either Emptiness (even zero) or Void (odd zero). But Ultra Being is the difference between these, the non-nihilistic distinction between these two interpretations of nonduality associated with Buddhism and Taoism. Ultra Being thus has an important role to play as the meniscus of the externality of the projection process and as the core of the genuine emergent event. We interpret these two kinds of existence, i.e. inward time as null sets and outward space as nil masses separated by the surface of the body itself, as pure discontinuities, either within or without. Across this pure discontinuity then juxtapositions can occur which are contradictories in noninterference and without
mixture and thus without paradox. In the Indian Jain metaphysics all opposites and duals are thought to form the supra-rational relation to each other all the time. The barrier itself between the two sides that are kept separate is itself unthinkable and can be pointed to logically as by Nagarjuna or Practically as by Lao Tzu as emptiness or void. Because of Aristotle’s Excluded Middle and Non-contradiction principles we cannot see them within our tradition, and thus for millennia paradox has reigned within our tradition with little hint of the existence of the supra-rational. But in order to understand Deleuze we must uncover this fundamental bias in our tradition and realize the difference between sense and meaning.

Sense as Deleuze says in Logic of Sense articulates itself in relation to a ground of paradox. But I say that meaning, as opposed to significance or sense, articulates itself in relation to a ground of the supra-rational nondual. So meaning, as I use the word, is something that the thing has in isolation from all other things when seen on the background of the supra-rational. Signification is diacritical and different from both sense and meaning. Deleuze develops the Logic of Sense but does not develop the Logic of Meaning, i.e. a semantics of the relation to the supra-rational rather than the paradoxical. In my way of thinking the meaning pours out of the pure discontinuity between the pages of the Jubalate Agno. It pours out of the rejoicing and praise that unites named individuals and animal species that rejoice and praise the Lord with their tongues. In order to make sense of Deleuze and his Logic of Sense we need another term, i.e. meaning in this special sense which is different from semantics. In other words we need to construct another series that takes into account the whole structure of the divided line, not just a lopsided view of it. Emptiness and Void are two views of the nondual. We only can approach them as interpretations of existence by contrasting the two limits of the divided line, i.e. paradox and the supra-rational. Once we understand that nonduals are supra-rational, and that they appear as the discontinuities that appear in the divided line itself, then we can begin to appreciate that there is a deeper nondual than either emptiness or void which is the major discontinuity in the divided line between doxa and ratio. I call this difference manifestation, but Deleuze calls it expressivity. He specifically says at the beginning of his Spinoza book that Expression is another name for Manifestation. And he specifically contrasts the infolding from many to one or unfolding from one to many and says that expression is what is between or gives rise to the infolding and unfolding. Expression is the appearance of the nondual within the intervals of the divided line. Manifestation is the appearance of the nondual in the discontinuous divisions of the line itself, i.e. Manifestation is supra-rational and Expression is related to paradoxicality. Thus there is a discontinuity between one and many across which the infolding and unfolding occurs which together is expressivity. That discontinuity when it is within ratio is emptiness and when it is within doxa is void, but when it is between doxa and ratio it is manifestation. So expressivity and manifestation are not the same in my view but complements of each other related to paradox or supra-rationality. But expressivity is a manifestation of nonduality within Being as the included middle and prior term of difference between creation and emanation. Manifestation on the other hand is the prior arising of the pure discontinuities that support the supra-rational and which defines the realm of doxa and ratio within which nonduality can appear as expression. But the very fact that Deleuze starts with expression as a nondual between creation and emanation, between one and many, between infolding and unfolding is extremely significant for my argument that he is attempting to approximate an understanding of Ultra Being and going beyond Wild Being in the process. This is because Ultra Being is the non-nihilistic distinction between emptiness and void, but that distinction is made on the background of the difference between doxa and ratio set up by the nonduality of manifestation. Expressivity opens up at the lower meta-levels of Being,
and within the intervals of doxa and ratio. But Sense can only have its sense by its difference with meaning generated out of the nondual, i.e. emptiness, void or the deeper nondual of manifestation. And on the other side meaning can only have its meaning based on the establishment of sense. Sense escapes the proposition, its reference and the one who says it as Deleuze points out. Sense means both good sense and common sense on the one hand and sensation and the sensible on the other hand. Meaning refers to the inter/intra/penetration/surfacing that creates pure discontinuities that are non-experientialable and non-thinkable but without paradox and with simultaneously true contradictories. Meaning produces the disconnects that are the opening in which sense can operate. Yet both of these are different from signification and semantics which refers to diacritics in context and the play of syntax.

Deleuze does not clearly distinguish between sense and meaning, between paradox as ground and the supra-rational nondual as ground. That is because he is still working within the limits imposed by Aristotle and the principle of excluded middle and non-contradiction. Deleuze senses this limitation and attempts to delineate it occasionally. But unless you start from a comprehension of the nondual say as we get in the work by David Loy called Nonduality, it is difficult to clearly see the difference of paradoxicality and supra-rationality. So in order to make sense of Deleuze we must do to him what he does to his own philosopher subjects of his anarchic method, we must twist the meaning of his terms so that we can see the difference between the play of sense and the seriousness of meaning. Where he tries to pull the sense from the philosophies which are the objects of his study, we need to try to pull the meaning from Deleuze as it sets down the preconditions for the arising of sense which in turn is the precondition for the arising of signification and semantics.

Deleuze is fighting his whole life against the philosophy of Heidegger and trying to support the work of his Master Sartre in comparison with that of Merleau-Ponty. Yet at the end of his life he plummets to his own death in suicide becoming an example of a falling dasein. Like Alice falling into the hole when she goes after the rabbit, there is an endless falling as time slows down. But Deleuze wants to show that there is a difference between the in-itself and the for-itself that Sartre takes from Hegel and uses in Being and Nothingness. In Deleuze this becomes difference-in-itself and repetition-for-itself. In Islam the meaning of suicide is the endless repetition of the act itself. So from the point of view of this myth of the Other Deleuze jumped into pure endless repetition when he committed suicide, yet the entry into this state is through falleness of being-in-the-world. Being-in turns into Being-for at the discontinuity when his body hits the ground. In the realm of sense there is only past and future disconnected. The present when the body hits the ground is an absence. So perhaps it made sense to jump but that ramifies mythically in the Other as endless repetition for itself. Forgotten are those passages where Nietzsche praises Islam for being a religion without resentment. Forgotten is Nietzsche’s own formulation of the immanent discriminator of values, eternal return. Would you want to live over your life, including the fall to your death endlessly? Chose a life you would want to live endlessly as guiding principle of which values to enact in your life. This principle does not appeal to any transcendental. So what is ownmost to Deleuze, i.e. Nietzsche, and what is Other, i.e. Islam that Nietzsche praises, agree that suicide is a bad idea. We cannot get inside the head of Deleuze and psychoanalyze him in hindsight, to figure out why he jumped. But as a conceptual personae he will always be known for the way he ended his life. And it is difficult to look at this means of suicide in terms of anything but a transformation from Being-in to Being-for across the discontinuity around which past and future telescoped of the present moment where he hit the ground where he was converted from an individual in a set of his own into a mass of pulverized flesh where his monad infolded on itself to be a subject of
eternal repetition which never achieves Life again. We repeat the name of Deleuze but that never gives us back the man who might change his opinion were he still living. Sartre thought of Being-for as little pools of nothingness. It is the antimony of the Process Being of Heidegger. Merleau-Ponty recognized that the third meta-level of Being must be the hyper dialectic between the two terms in this antimony. And Wild Being must be something that steps outside this antimony, orthogonal to it. In the hyper dialectic between Process Being and Nothingness there is a still point of pure discontinuity between the metaphysical duals. But when we extend out to the next meta-level toward Wild Being then there is again a difference between the discontinuity and the extension into the other meta-level of Being which introduces Ultra Being. Each next meta-level of Being grows out of the difference between the last two meta-levels of Being. Ultra Being is the ontological difference between the hyper dialectic of Being and Nothingness and Wild Being. Process Being is the mixture of Pure Being and Time. It is the type of being related to the ready-to-hand modality of being-in-the-world. But Sartre takes the antimony of dasein and considers being for itself as a black hole at the center of consciousness. Ultra Being is the event horizon of this black hole that guards the singularity which goes beyond the rules of consciousness the way physical singularity goes beyond the laws of physics. Wild Being is what is scattered across and written on this surface of Ultra Being.

When a world is shattered, like that of Deleuze when he commits suicide, then the separate kinds of Being fragment and no longer produce the face of the world which brings all the kinds of Being together. It is the ultimate nihilistic event and is the opposite of the emergent event of untamed life living in and for itself. Deleuze had affirmed a vision of life living in and for itself that he took over from Nietzsche. But what caused him to precipitate his own death? One might say Ultra Being which is associated with poison, sin, evil and is the radical nature of difference in itself. Since Being has four aspects identity/difference, truth/fiction, real/illusion, and presence/absence, then we can say fiction-in-itself, illusion-in-itself, and absence-in-itself as well. At the fifth meta-level of Being all these negative aspects are conjuncted. We see all the positive aspects fuse in Pure Being. Pure Being is continuity and determinateness based on fusion. Ultra Being is pure discontinuity and indeterminateness up against the limit of the supra-rational as singular disjunctions. But that unthinkable Being, the externality of the projection of intelligibility, is what unfolds at the heart of suicide, i.e. self destruction and what makes it a sin in all religions. We call commission of suicide “doing the unthinkable.” When we break open the thinkable, and expose all it’s working parts, all the meta-levels of Being we eventually get to this kernel of the unthinkable, the unconceputal core of the concept, the naked singularity. In Alchemy it is called the Sol Nigier, the black sun. When we look at the sun we go blind. This blindness is the dark side of the too bright of the Sun of the Good.

He was my Teacher

“The sadness of generations without “teacher.” Our teachers are not just publich professors, though we badly need professors. Our teachers, once we reach adulthood, are those who bring us something radical and new, who know how to invent an artistic or literary techniques, finding those ways of thinking that correspond to our modernity, that is, our difficulties as well as our vague enthusiasms. We know there is only value for art, and even for truth: the “first-hand,” the authentic newness of something said, and the “unheard music” with which it is said. That is what Sartre for us (for us twenty-yer-olds during the Liberation). In those days, who except Sartre knew how to say anything new? Who taught us new ways to think? As brilliant and profound as the work of Merleau-Pony was, it was professorial and depended in may respect on Sartre’s work. (Sartre readily likened the existence of human beings to the non-being of a “hole” in the world: little lakes of nothingness, he called them. But Merleau-Pony took them to be folds, simple folds and pleats. In this way, one can distinguish a tough, penetrating existentialism fro a more tender and reserved existentialism.

2 Deleuze; Desert Islands page 77
We must start out with the hints that Deleuze gives us in order to interpret his work. And this hint as to his progenitors is crucial. In the same article he mentions Sartre’s *Critique of Dialectical Reason* as the necessary complement of *Being and Nothingness*. This is a much neglected work of Sartre. In it Sartre treats dialectics dialectically and focuses in on the fused group, what Cannetti calls the “pack” as the fundamental constituent of society, what Deleuze calls the socius. This fusion of the group that is the center of revolution, say at the storming of the Bastille, is the fundamental paradoxical field from which arises all the human institutions that Sartre traces in his book. He identifies the practico-inert of culture as that which remains unchanged unless we change it, the fundamental in itself of the world which is changed by the fundamental freedom of the for itself. If we go back to this core and then place it in the context that Merleau-Ponty does in *The Visible and the Invisible* of the hyper dialectic between Process Being and Nothingness out of which Wild Being emerges and which establishes the difference of Ultra Being, then I think we have a place to begin in order to understand the project of Deleuze. Deleuze says that we need the professors, but they do not give us the emergent event. Professors are the ones who in the terms of Kuhn carry on Normal Science but they do not give us Revolutionary Science. We need patent officers like Einstein to do that. As a Patent officer Einstein was constantly dealing with the new, the utterly new, and this is precisely what Deleuze saw in Sartre, a teaching of how to engender the emergent event, how to think the utterly new. So from Sartre came the necessity of rethinking the Being-for in relation to the Being-in. Sartre’s use of Hegel to understand Heidegger was seen as an essential misunderstanding. A reintrooduction of subjectivity as a radical kind of freedom which caused Heidegger to reject Sartre as an existentialist thinker, in spite of the fact that it was Sartre that put existentialism on the cultural map. It was according to Deleuze the newness of the ways of thinking of Sartre that pushed his “misinterpretation” of existentialism forward into the public eye as the leader of the intellectual elite. Sartre himself tried to remedy this situation by rewriting *Being and Nothingness* in terms of the social in *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. He realized that the mechanical interpretation of dialectics had never been questioned, and so he set out to produce an utterly dialectical interpretation of dialectics itself, that is to say dialectics for itself rather than merely in itself as a mechanism of history. If we see Deleuze as taking up this project in the context of Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of how there existed a hyper dialectic between Process Being and Nothingness and how that gives rise to Wild Being and perhaps the ultimate difference (fiction, illusion, and absence) of Ultra Being. In other words by recognizing that there was an antimony between Process Being of Heidegger and Nothingness of Sartre at the metaphysical level we see that Sartre’s contribution is not a “misinterpretation” so much as an inversion by pure reason, which means that what ever is out there is beyond this antimony, and thus the need for brute or wild Being as the further extension of the meta-levels of Being away from Derrida’s Differance or *Being* (crossed out). This comprehension of the antimonies of Heidegger and Sartre is the starting place for understanding how the for-itself can retain a role in the face of the in-itself, even after the demise of subjectivity. In Deleuze this becomes the difference between the difference-in-itself and repetition-for-itself.

But Deleuze realizes that there must be two series to support our triangulation of what lies beyond the third meta-level of the Hyper dialectic, i.e. a dialectic of the dialectic. The first level is the thesis and antithesis, the two fighters as Sartre talks about it. The entire Fight is a synthesis of rivalry which is the dialectic that moves through history on the back of contradictions. But the Hyper Dialectic is something different, it is the next meta-level up, it is the from whence the dialectic in each case unfolds. The dialectic itself is continually changing, continually producing a new face. Old rivalries become passé as emergent events
occur. If you do not understand the Hyper dialectic then you will not understand how history moved on and left Marxism, as a mechanical dialectic in the dust. Labor Unions became accepted and raised the standard of living of the Laborers to such a degree that they bought into the system of Capitalism, meanwhile Communist states became ruled by impenetrable Kafkaesque Bureaucracies that failed to give as much freedom to the workers as the capitalist system. By attempting to understand revolution at the social level through the fused group Sartre showed where the emergent event entered into history, and how the dialectic transforms itself as it unfolds in history. It is not a mechanism but something with an inner dynamic. Deleuze tried to capture the essence of this inner dynamic in his philosophy. But that is done by realizing that there is not just the Dialectics of the dialectic itself, but something beyond that, i.e. Wild Being and perhaps even Ultra Being. These are the frontiers of thought which Deleuze explores. The problem is knowing in each case when he is talking about which one. It is not an easy task. He does not clearly demark them within his thought. It is not clear that he knows that they are different. So there is an irony that the philosophy of difference is founded on a forgetfulness of difference. In effect difference withdraws in exactly the way Heidegger says Being withdraws in a way that is not recognized by Deleuze himself. Part of the reason that Deleuze cannot see this withdrawal is that he does not separate sense from meaning, i.e. paradox from the supra-rational. We have in Sartre the fused group, but we do not have the supra-rational group that has contradictions that appear to be isolated and effective at the same time. We do not have the supra-rational group in Sartre. This is what arises as the fifth meta-level of Being where para-consistency and para-completeness appears as the embodiment of the tetralemma (A, ~A, both and neither pointing at emptiness). The work of Deleuze is haunted by the Supra-rational. His work on the logic of sense is haunted by the logic of meaning. He continually talks about two series, but not the discontinuity between the two pages, Let… For … which allows meaning into the world of sense.

What is interesting, is that Deleuze does not recognize the meta-levels of Being explicitly even though he consciously tries to climb from level to level in many places in his work. His Logic of Sense is the inheritor of Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica. Russell and Whitehead attempt to banish paradox completely from the world of Logic and then to found Mathematics on Set theory. But we discover from Godel that this is an impossible task and that systems will always be undecidable. So Deleuze goes to the next step and admits that Paradox must have a function, that nonsense must be accepted as something useful, that it is the background on which Sense is produced. Yet Deleuze does not seize on the Theory of Higher Logical Types as did Bateson, in order to differentiate the levels of Being as levels of learning. Thus Deleuze does not have a model of the differences between the meta-levels of Being, and because of that he cannot sharply discriminate these levels as he would like to do. However, if we take the Theory of Higher Logical Types from Russell and Whitehead as a framework for understanding the meta-levels of Being then suddenly we can sharply distinguish what for Deleuze is ambiguous and misty and thus bring meaning to his understanding of sense. Meaning arises out of these discontinuities within the spectrum of Sense. C. Smart had it right when he wrote the Jubilate Agno on two sheets of adjacent paper. In Deleuze the two series appear as two types of work, historical centering on a name from the tradition, and his own work from his own thought stream, and finally his work with Guattari, i.e. done in the socius itself. He goes from the name in the tradition, to his own name, two his name paired with Guattari. In his work with Guattari he attempts to produce the paradoxical point where his work is fused to the thought of another. He reads the names of the history of Philosophy, the outcasts and misfits of that history in a way that is dialectically dialectical following the lead of his teacher Sartre. He reads the names of the history of philosophy
through his own lens, but by that he sharpens his own vision by seeing them anew. So standing in for Sartre the mentor and Merleau-Ponty, the professor we get instead Spinoza and Leibniz. Leibniz is seen as the figure enfolded in folds like Merleau-Ponty. Spinoza on the other hand is the prince of philosophers of immanence. Both Spinoza and Leibniz think immanence as expressionism. They are a pair, and as Bateson says in Mind and Nature there is a strange improvement in information if we take two subjects and study them at once. Deleuze applies this technique of doubling often considering philosophers in pairs. He transposes his concern with Sartre and Merleau-Ponty and the problem of what comes next which is new out of them with the advent of Wild Being and perhaps Ultra Being into a quest into the secret conversation between Spinoza and Leibniz. In order to advance we must retreat into another age another past philosophical period and understand it anew in order to insert a difference within the history of philosophy so that we end up in an alternative philosophical universe. Deleuze is the time traveler who goes back in time to make a small change, killing a butterfly in the past, that results in a complete change in history of philosophy today. By rereading the past with difference Deleuze changes the nature of history in the present and thus hopes to get a radically new understanding in the present producing the type of change that Sartre, his teacher, did for him yet again himself. And Deleuze succeeds to the extent that he finds, as through a glass darkly, Ultra Being beyond Wild Being.

Leibniz and Spinoza

My impression is that Spinoza and Leibniz are stand-ins for Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Deleuze explicitly in his essay on his teacher mentions the fact that Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is related to pleats and folds and that is precisely what the Leibniz book is about. However, it is more difficult to see how Spinoza is a stand in for Sartre unless we consider Sartre as a philosopher of immanence. Sartre is the philosopher of black holes. His philosophy of Nothingness is precisely the philosophy of the black hole in a Riemann spacetime manifold. In fact, it is amazing how Sartre had philosophized about the nothingness prior to the importance of the black hole in physics. This is an example of an emergent event coming from the inside first and then later being discovered to be of significance outside in the universe as a phenomena. So if we think of spacetime and immanence then Sartre’s little lakes and pools of nothingness are the exceptional places within the plane of immanence. Deleuze thinks that Spinoza is the one philosopher who most radically rejects all transcendence. But we do not get the sense that Spinoza is thinking about the exceptions within the immanence, yet Deleuze in his focus on singularities is very much oriented toward the singular within the immanent. So the parallel between Sartre and Spinoza is not as direct as that between Leibniz and Merleau-Ponty. But it is as if we must get down what immanence can mean before we can think about the exceptions within the immanence. The Expressionism book is about the meaning of that immanence. Once philosophy stopped worrying about God then a lot of arguments got lost which were very sophisticated. Deleuze wants to go back to that period and excavate some of those lost arguments and bring them into our discussion today, because he thinks they underwrite some of what needs to be understood if we are going to be able to appreciate the necessity of the Being-for as well as the Being-in. With Heidegger’s work the Being-for has gotten lost, and Sartre attempted to retrieve it by turning Process Being inside out and into Nothingness. But we cannot reconstitute it as subjectivity, so Deleuze wants to reconstitute it as repetition-for-itself in relation to the being-in-itself of things in the world which includes dasein as being-in-the-world. In other words we get an external view of dasein rather than an internal view of it as the pre-subjective.

The first point that Deleuze gets across in the Expressionism book on Spinoza is the nature of Expression. He says that once you have One
and Many then you get the unfolding from one to many of emanation, or the standing against the one of the many of creationism, or the infolding from many to one, de-emanation or apocalypse. Expressionism is defined as the difference between the infolding and the unfolding. Manifestation is given as another name for Expressionism. But we want to reserve the word manifestation for the deeper nondual beyond void and emptiness. Notice that the discontinuity that must exist between one and many or between the elements of the many are not considered worthy of mention. Without those discontinuities there could not be any unfolding or infolding to make expressionism possible. So manifestation is something prior to expressionism and has to do with supra-rationality rather than paradoxicality. Mixing can only occur after the unmixed materials are produced. There has to first be the intrinsic difference between one and many or within the many between themselves before there can be paradoxical mixing of one and many by infolding and unfolding or the standing against the One of created things. So right from the beginning we get a clear definition of expressionism in terms of the relation of one to many, and the nondual perspective is missing. That perspective has been made clear by Loy in his book Nonduality and also elaborated in the author’s draft monograph Nondual Science. Nonduality posits that there is something other than One or Many that is non-conceptual and non-experiential but which is efficacious enough to be used to delimit the One and the Many. That something else has been called Emptiness by the Buddhists and Void by the Taoists. We call the deeper nondual that is indicated by Islamic Sufism manifestation. It relates to the Attributes of God called Sifat. Beyond that is the coherence of the attributes of God called the Dhat. So there are at least two deeper levels of nonduality beyond emptiness and void. Normal Christian ideas of God see Him as the Supreme Being and thus One. The idea that there is a God without Being is a fantastic idea, but is natural to the Semites, who have no idea of Being in their language and instead talk about the necessary existence of God and the non-existence of creation. However, the position that is taken here is that the God of the Sufis in Islam has no existence nor being but is pure manifestation. God is not something found, i.e. an existent, but He who finds. This merely offers a deeper context from which to consider the arguments put forward by Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza concerning God within the Western Tradition. The question is what is the standing of God Himself. For the Western Tradition God is a Being. But only the Indo-Europeans have a concept of Being. The Semites did not have such a concept, instead they had a concept of existence which is deeper than Being. But in Sufism, rather than the theologians or the philosophers among the Muslims, there is the concept of the Tajalliat of God, i.e. His manifestation that is deeper than either Being or Existence. And example is the work of Al-Niffari or Shaykh Al-Akbar. The standing you give God determines the depth of your theology and causes a reinterpretation of the absolute. Moving to a different standing for God is like an emergent event at the level of the absolute.

Establishing the difference between manifestation and expressivity not recognized by Deleuze, then allows a place for the nondual meaning within our understanding of the arguments of Spinoza and Leibniz about God. Expressivity is itself a kind of nondual between infolding and unfolding, between creationism and emanationism. But it is a nondual as it appears within Being, as the nondual in relation to the nihilistic duals set up within Being. Expressivity gives us the traditional Indo-European nonduals which are Orders, Rights, Goods, Fates, Sources and Roots. Expressivity is how the nondual is articulated within the dualism of province of Being below the fifth meta-level. However, at the fifth meta-level Ultra Being appears as the difference between emptiness and void, and beyond that meta-level there is probably no Being as that is the realm of Manifestation and the other higher standings of God beyond Existence.

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3 See http://trace-studies.org
4 Tajalliat
Deleuze makes the point that from expressivity comes sense. The paradox comes from the mixing of infolding and unfolding. On the background of this fusion or diffusion there is produced localized sense which is different from signification, reference or the speaker as discussed in Logic of Sense. The fact that there is a direct connection between the articulation of the nondual within Being called expressivity and sense is a key point made throughout the book. Deleuze connects the concept of expressionism with anti-Cartesianism of Leibniz and Spinoza. But in Spinoza this is radicalized by the identification of one substance which is both God and Creation. This connection is made through Duns Scotus and the idea of Univocity. Univocity means that Creation expresses the nature of God in the same sense that God expresses his own nature. Univocity means that the two things about creation and God are said in the same sense. Univocity means that one says what one does, and that this is true of God so that the creation as it appears to us and through us, is at the same time telling us something about God Himself, which is again what God is telling himself. Univocity is the means by which we are able to read the book of nature and see it as being an indication about the nature of the Creator, and also about the inner conversation of the Creator with Himself which has no need for the creation. So Univocity is an important concept, that is merely mentioned in the other books and not well explained. But in the Spinoza book it is clearly articulated and its importance made clear. Univocity is about saying what you do and doing what you say. It is not merely about the fact that the different types of Being are unified at some level by fiat as Badiou charges in his book about Deleuze, i.e. that Deleuze is a secret unitarian behind the guise of reveling in heterogeneity. Rather, what Deleuze is rooting for is a position in which one finds that different things that are said express the same thing, or the same thing is expressed in different things. So for instance repetitions express the unrepeatable in the same sense. Or different modes or categories of Being express the same sense. If we do not get this idea right, none of what Deleuze says can be understood at all. It is a very specific concept of coherence within Being, which is applied by Deleuze beyond the arguments that Duns Scotus makes with respect to God. And it is what makes expression and sense important in Deleuze because it is through this medium of expression that gives rise to sense that the Univocity is achieved.

One thing I learned from the Spinoza book on Expressionism is that the traditional levels of analysis of things into: substance, essence, attributes, and modes are in fact are representativies for the four kinds of Being. To these Deleuze adds singularities to bring us to Ultra Being. So Pure Being is substance, Essence appears at the level of Process Being. Attributes appear at the level of Hyper Being, and Modes appear at the level of Wild Being. Once you understand this then the entire book about Spinoza and in fact all of traditional philosophy starts to make sense in terms of the kinds of Being. We can add to that the fact that in Aristotle there is also a correlation between the modes and the kinds of Being. Necessity or Determinacy is Pure Being, Actuality or Accident or Probabilities are Process Being. Possibility is at the level of Hyper Being. And Potentiality is at the level of Wild Being. So there are two vocabularies for the kinds of being in terms of Modes and in terms of the layers of Being prior to the manifestation of modes. If we keep this in mind then we can see how deeply the kinds of Being are embedded in traditional philosophy. And all this talk of the layers of Being and the modes of Being all get transferred to talk about God as the Supreme Being. Spinoza thinks that there is only one substance and that both God and Nature are of that substance. For Spinoza it makes no sense to numerically separate the substance from itself or from anything else. So all the differences occur at the level of essences, attributes, and modes of Being. Both things and God have attributes and essences. What differs is the modes and the play of finitude and infinity between God and creatures. God is associated with infinities and creatures with finitude and man is able to conceive of infinities and thus commune with God. We can also relate this argument to the
one that Deleuze gives in *Logic of Sense*. There he calls the speaker “manifestation” and that can be seen as substance expressing itself. Denotation can be seen as essences which are its expressions. Signification is the attributes which are expressed. That leaves mode as the level for the expression of sense. The point is that as Deleuze always says what is expressed completely encapsulates expression itself. So the four way relations between the substrate of sense and sense itself can be seen to have its precursor in the distinctions of traditional philosophy between substance, essence, attribute and mode. As much as things have seemed to change in contemporary postmodern philosophy, Deleuze makes the point by his analysis that nothing has really changed at all and in fact we have lost some of the sophistication of the arguments of the past by seeming to have moved on to other arguments over other topics when actually the same thing is being expressed in a different way. And what is univocal is the kinds of Being as meta-levels. The kinds of Being are expressed in many ways in different senses within the world. Deleuze wants us to realize that not only are there kinds of Being which are seen as Being-in but there are also kinds of Being which are Being-for. We might call these different kinds of Being-For meta-levels of Knowledge instead of meta-levels of Being. As in my paper on Knowledge Discovery and Emergence we might see that for each meta-level of Being there is a meta-level of Knowledge that is akin to the meta-levels of Learning articulated by Bateson in *Steps to the Ecology of the Mind*.

The role of understanding amounts to its part in a logic of expression. Such a logic is the outcome of a long tradition, from the Stoics down through the Middle Ages. One distinguishes in an expression (say, a proposition) what it expresses and what it designates. What is expressed is, so to speak, a sense that has no existence outside the expression: it must thus be referred to an understanding that grasps it objectively, that is, ideally. But it is predicated of the thing, and not of the expression itself; understanding relates it to the object designated, as the essence of that object. One can then conceive how names may be distinguished by their senses, while these different senses relate to the same designated object whose essence they constitute. There is a sort of transposition of this theory of sense in Spinoza’s conception of attributes. Each attribute is a distinct name or expression; what is expressed has no existence outside the attribute, it is none the less related to substance as to the object designated by all the attributes. Thus all expressed senses together for the “expressible” or the essence of substance, and the later may in its turn be said to express itself in the attributes.

So we can see how we would get back to the Stoics in the *Logic of Sense* because they are the root of this tradition of expressionism. Also we see how expressionism is purely immanent because it does not exist outside the expression. And we can see the intimate relation between expressionism and sense because all the senses expressed form the expressible. But the expressible is the articulation of the nondual within Being which escapes monism or dualism or even pure plurality. It cannot be captured by any numerical delimitation just as the substance of God/Nature in Spinoza’s conception cannot be cut or delimited.

Our argument here is that Deleuze is starting with something deep which is completely missing from modern philosophy, an appreciation of the nondual, which was developed as an antidote to Cartesian dualism by Leibniz and Spinoza. Deleuze wants to resurrect that appreciation nonduality within Being and use that as the basis for an appreciation of the Being-for which was purged by Heidegger and brought back in a radical and gross way by Sartre, merely by creating an antimony with Process Being called Nothingness. To escape this antimony then you need some appreciation of the nondual. Deleuze goes back into the history of philosophy to archeologically dig up this earlier appreciation of the nondual within Being in order to use it in his modern philosophizing. Unfortunately the transition to his modern work does not draw the comparison at the surface but leaves it to the reader as an exercise to compare the two series and bring forward expression, sense, and

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5 Expressionism page 62
univocity from the Spinoza book into our reading of the non-historical books such as Difference and Repetition and Logic of Sense. Deleuze by his obscurity of his own books is forcing us to move back and forth between the two series of books and see the clarity of those books about other philosophers. As he says every Monad has both clear and obscure parts, and those of Deleuze are in his two series of books. If we don’t go back to the Spinoza book on Expressionism then we do not get the clear picture of Univocity, Expressionism and Sense within a classical context as the primal anti-Cartesianism. Heidegger is recognized as an anti-Cartesian, but Deleuze is saying that he is not the first anti-Cartesian, and perhaps the prior anti-Cartesians were more sophisticated than the latter ones, and perhaps they had a place for the Being-For and have not reduced it to the Being-In. Deleuze is bringing the tradition itself to bear in the argument between Sartre and Heidegger. He is building on the antimony recognized by Merleau-Ponty that legitimized the contribution of Sartre. He is contrasting the antimony of Sartre and Heidegger with the previous anti-Cartesianism of Leibniz and Spinoza. He is showing that Leibniz is a precursor to the solution of Merleau-Ponty which identifies Wild Being, or the fold (Chiasm of reversibility) as what is orthogonal to Hyper Being. He is showing that Spinoza had the idea of Univocity, Expressionism and uncapturable Sense as the terms which allows us to understand a third element outside the antimonies, and on that basis we can conceive of another solution, and internal one to the hyper dialectic which is Ultra Being which is seen as event horizon around the singularity. In the dialectic between difference in itself and repetition for itself, which is prior to the arising of subject and object as pure in-itself or for-itself there is a generation of sense as a univocal expression that is immanent. It is a brilliant move made by a master player in the philosophic game.

To be clear, Deleuze thinks that the whole of the tradition should be brought to bear on the debate between Heidegger and Sartre. Sartre does not just misinterpret Heidegger, but brings back an important corrective to the extremism of Heidegger which is really a monism because it has gotten rid of the traditional dualism between Being-in and Being-for. Deleuze brings back from the dead Spinoza and Leibniz to testify that there are other forms of anti-Cartesianism besides that of Heidegger that have been proposed before. That of Leibniz has strange resonances with that of Merleau-Ponty. But he also believes that there is another solution to the Hyper Dialectic between Process Being and Nothingness besides Wild Being, one which is more internal, one that reaches to Ultra Being. And this deeper solution harkens back to Univocity, Expressionism, and Sensibility and their place as nonduals within the realm of duality. Expressionism further points back for us to Manifestation the deeper nondual from the supra-rational realm, rather from the realm within Being. It brings out a hidden assumption that Deleuze does not see in his own project, the acceptance of excluded middle and the lack of awareness of the opposition between sense and meaning which flows from the nondual itself. So by going back to the Spinoza and Leibniz books we get a double benefit, i.e. seeing one of Deleuze’s presuppositions and also seeing in a clear context his definitions of Univocity, Expressionism and Sense. We contrast to these Hetervocity, Manifestation, and Meaning. In existence each phenomenon speaks with its own voice by its manifestation and what it manifests is its meaning from itself. All the phenomena have their own voices that are separate and have their own songs to sing in those voices which express their unique meanings. But all this occurs in Existence outside of Being. Even Being has its own voice which manifests its meaning, that meaning is paradox, so within Being there is a Univocity which each thing expresses the same, i.e. Being itself as an intelligible projection process, and so all the kinds of Being express the same sense on the ground of the paradox of Being. We can use the Hetervocity, Manifestation and Meaning to contrast to the Univocity, Expression and Sense. But then we can use the latter to understand the meaning of the hyper-dialectic between the Being-in and
Being-for in *Difference and Repetition* and also the origins of Sense from Nonsense in the *Logic of Sense*. You have to have the difference between Being-in and Being-for in order for expressivity to take place and for different things to be univocal within Being. You have to have the ground of paradox to give rise to sense. By going back into the tradition to an anti-Cartesianism prior to Heidegger Deleuze institutes a change in the meaning of the Hyper Dialectic posed by Merleau-Ponty to legitimize the work of Sartre, which Sartre went on to further legitimize by building the complementary project to *Being and Nothingness* at the social level in the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. Heidegger had no conception of the Social except Mitsein which rendered Dasein inauthentic. Sartre asked what was the authentic revolutionary social group at the center of all institutions. Deleuze saw that group as a swarm of monads which encapsulated for-itself and did not just exist in-the-world as another in-itself. Deleuze saw the fusion of the fused group as paradox and that paradox articulated a nondual position as expressivity and gave sense to the world. Deleuze brings the philosophical tradition to bear on Heidegger’s position in order to legitimize the position of Sartre who appealed to Hegel to understand Heidegger. Deleuze has tried to show that this was actually not a misunderstanding on the part of his teacher but a deep critique that should be taken seriously. The argument has the force of the tradition of philosophy behind it. It is a very powerful argument because it is based not just on his opinion, but on two series, and between these series there is an expression of sense which neither series alone can capture. There is the heightened information that Bateson speaks of in *Mind and Nature*. The heightened information is what makes sense in the light of the tradition as read through the eyes of Deleuze, and then we see Deleuze read through the eyes of the Tradition because the voices of Leibniz and Spinoza themselves come into play. They as conceptual persona come alive in this interplay of expression of sense. It is not just as we have with Aristotle and Heidegger, the misrepresentation of the predecessors as supporting our argument or as idiots that did not understand as much as we have understood. Rather we have the full force of Leibniz and Spinoza as anti-Cartesians brought to bear in the argument against Heidegger in favor of the Being-For highlighted by Sartre who in turn brought Hegel to bear on Heidegger. In other words the opposition is getting its own voice heard rather than merely offering support by appeals only greeted by silence. There may be a univocity in Being but there is definitely a hetrovocity in the tradition of philosophy itself, the conceptual persona are at each others throats. But Deleuze does not confront Heidegger directly or on his own, and he does not mention his teacher whom he is defending. Rather Deleuze goes back into the tradition to a prior anti-Cartesianism and resurrects that to fight his battle for him, and then uses their position in order to probe deeper than Heidegger does when he sets up a world without Being-for in order to elucidate Being-in as being-in-the-world, i.e. dasein as externality of the projection of Being itself. To this Deleuze contrasts Ultra Being as difference-in-itself, radicalized as sin, evil and poison to which we might add fiction-in-itself, illusion-in-it-self, and absence-in-itself. To these obverses of the aspects of Being, Deleuze contrasts repetition-for-itself, i.e. the anti-representational un-self-conscious behind the self-consciousness and the ego. Each monad must encompass the whole world, it is not just Being-in, but it has within it the whole world, as Being-for itself. Monads are external to each other, but the world is in all of them, so though their Being-for they express Being-in. It is a much more sophisticated position, which then brings univocity, expression and sense into play in the hyper dialectic between the external unfolding of Process Being and the internal unfolding in the little pools of Nothingness.

Yet we also see how this deeper argument because of the talk of God, by Leibniz and Spinoza, actually brings us back to an understanding of what is left out of the discussion which is existence as void and emptiness and the deeper nondual of
manifestation, which gives rise to meaning though hetervocity. The whole tradition in the West labors under the principle of Excluded Middle and non-contradiction, Deleuze included, along with Heidegger, and Sartre. All their existentialisms do not quite reach existence itself, they are all articulations of Being still. In order to reach existence we have to go to the deeper levels of the meta-levels of Being where the phase transition to Existence lurks. The monster of Typhoon or Python, or Grendal, still lurks at the root of the Western worldview. Zeus, or Apollo, or Beowulf did not exterminate it completely but merely drove it deeper as we see when we confront Grendal’s Mom. When we allow that monstrosity of existence, creation ex nihilo, to surface then we see that there is an infrastructural duality between Being and Existence which we can use to understand the meaning of sense and the sense of meaning in the double series of texts by Deleuze which in turn refer back to other texts with double series like those of Spinoza and Carroll. Prior to mixing in Paradox that is the ground of sense there must be the production ex nihilo of the elements to be mixed out of the nondual itself which is Supra-rational. Those elements have a hetervocity in their existence prior to the univocity within Being, i.e. under the projection of intelligibility in Being under the four aspects of truth, reality, identity and presence. If we take Pure Being as the unity of these as the continuous and determinate then we will understand Ultra Being at the other end of the spectrum of the kinds of Being as anti-aspect-in-itself and we will contrast that with repetition-for-itself which is the basis of the kinds of knowledge and between the two will be the expression of sense in a univocity.