The Structure of Theoretical Systems in relation to Emergence

 

Working Papers toward the Dissertation

 

Kent Palmer, Ph.D.

Sociology

London School of Economics

Professor Martin (Advisor)

April 1978

 

 

 

(These papers were written in the years of 1977 and 1978)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

kent@palmer.name

http://kent.palmer.name

http://archonic.net

 

Copyright 1978 All Rights Reserved. Not for Distribution.

 

CONTENTS:

 

GUIDE (this document)

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION

From the problem of Emergence through primordial Truth to the Advent of the Novum as the Essencing forth of the “Clearing of Being.”

 

Section I Prolegomena

The preparation for the move from Sociology toward a philosophical Inquiry and the Query concerning the Unquestionable.

A Tiryakians Confusion

B The Model of Transcendence

C Inquiry: Query

D Querying Presuppositions

 

Section II Within the Clearing

Ontological Monism and the Four Philosophical Disciplines which lead toward the consideration of the Knot of Paradoxicality.

A Sameness / Transcendence

B Ontological Monism

C Phenomenology / Ontology

D Hermeneutics

E Dialectics

F Foucault’s Order of Things

G Zolla: Oneness as Idea

H Knot of Paradox

 

Section III The Boundary of the Clearing

Descartes and Heidegger: two approaches to Groundlessness: Skepticism & Nihilism: Husserl & Kant; the approach to Transcendence: The Icon of Dimensionality and the Manifold.

A Two Philosophical Encounters with Groundlessness: Descartes and Heidegger

B Scepticism, Nihilism and Death

C Husserl: The Motif and Nets of Transcendence

D Interpenetration and The Icon of Dimensionality

E The Manifold and its Intervals in Relation to Kant’s Philosophy

F (Roots of the Heidegger Illusion in Husserl’s Logical Investigations; not written)

G Boundary and Limit in Kant’s Philosophy

 

Section IV Within the Boundary

The development of the Icon of the “Clearing of Being.”

A The Life Form of Ideation as Manifestation  of Nihilism

B Nihilism and its Basis (The Husk)

C Exploring the Basis of Nihilism

D The Metaphor of the Basis of Nishilism

E Towards “What is Beyond the Basis of Nihilism”

F (Beyond the Basis (The Non-Nihilistic Distinction) not written)

 

 

Section V The Ontics of Sociation (not written)

A rediscovery of the first sociology book: The Republic (a journey through Hell).

 

Epilogue Beowulf and Gilgamesh on Glory (not written)

Once we are so related and drawn to what withdraws, we are drawing into what, withdraws, into the enigmatic and therefore mutable near-ness of its appeal. Whenever man is properly drawing that way, he is thinking - even though he may still be far away from what with-draws, even though the withdrawal may remain veiled as ever. All through his life and right into his death, Socrates did nothing else than place himself into this draft^, this current, and maintain himself in it. This is why he is the purest thinker of the West. This is why he wrote nothing. For anyone who begins to write out of thoughtfulness must inevitably be like those people who run to seek refuge from any draft too strong for them. An as yet hidden history still keeps the secret why all great  Western thinkers after Socrates, with all their greatness, had to be such fugitives.

 

Heidegger, What is Called Thinking, p. 17

 

THE GUIDE to The Structure of Theoretical Systems in Relation to the Problem of Emergence

 

This paper is formed on a very simple ground plan.  This ground plan is based on the recognition that a single model informs the whole of modern western philosophy.  This model is very complex however, and so it is approached from different aspects in each section of the paper.  The model may be called the Clearing-in-Being.  The clearing-in-being is the simulation in terms of onto-theo-logical metaphysics of the world in which we live.  It may be tentatively imagined to be like a clearing in a forest in which we all of a sudden find ourselves.

 

Section I attempts to establish our bearings within this clearing.

 

Section II explores what is inside the clearing itself and its absolute limits.

 

Section III explores a particular feature of the clearing which is its boundary.

 

Section IV dives into the boundary and attempts to explore it in depth.

 

Within this broad developmental outline many themes inter-weave.

 

The major theme which is related to the topic of the essay (i.e. emergence) is what is called the clearing of being. This is in contrast to the Heideggarian clearing-in-being. The clearing of being points to the fact that this basic philosophical model when looked at in its totality is self-canceling.  That is all the terms in its theoretical structuring cancel each other out with no remainder.  Thus the model is in contrast to its own self-cancellation.

 

This self-cancellation is identified with all that is beyond the metaphorical clearing in the forest.  The point is that the cancellation process has a particular structure, which is called the Novum.  This is in contrast to the phenomena of emergence which is a completely intra-clearing effect caused by the construction of the theoretical model of the clearing in being.  By contrasting the process of cancellation of the whole model to the process of emergence, by which the clearing attempts to avoid cancellation, the nature of the latter is highlighted.  The concept of cancellation is necessitated by the model's own prevalence in existence. Much like K. Poppers notion of The Logic of Scientific Discovery, certification must involve implicitly falsification as a possibility.  The whole of the paper has as its aim to show how this relation between the clearing and its cancellation works.

 

Section I

 

This section is for the most part a low brow and gradual introduction to a point of departure for the exploration of

the major themes of the essay.

 

Part A Tiryakians Confusion

 

It begins on a more or less trivial example of con­fusion concerning ontological matters by a purported soci­ologist.  From this confusion concerning the difference between what is called 'The Ultimate Question' (of Leibniz) and 'The Question of Ontological Difference' (of Heidegger), it goes on to show the relation between these two questions and from that to constructing a generalized model of an axiomatic platform.  A set of axioms forms a platform from which scientific or philosophical inquiry might start.

 

Therefore any set of axioms may form a touch stone and reference point by which it is possible to take our bearings within the clearing.

 

Part B The Model of Transcendence

 

Once home base has been established it is possible to consider moving away from it.  Next a model of transcendence is posited taken from Heidegger/Jaspers.  It is analyzed as an example of a particular theoretical structure:  The Cubic Array.  And it is shown to have the basic structure of the core of an axiomatic platform.

 

Part C  Inquiry:Query

 

The basic kind of movement away from an axiomatic platform is called inquiry.  Here Heidegger's and Sartres conceptions of inquiry are analyzed and it is found that they too have the same basic structure as the core of the axiomatic platform.  This basic structure is then in contrast to what is seen to underlie it.  This is called the Query. It is the basic impulse and attitude that underlies the structure of Inquiry.  It is contrast to Heidegger's con­cept of "Dasein".

 

Part D Querying Presuppositions

 

The query is directed at the un-questionable.  From here we then approach the philosophical relation to one's presuppositions via Merleau-Ponty's formulation of the

problem.  This serves as a context for the introduction

of some of basic themes of the rest of the essay and of

Merleau-Ponty's own apparatus of inquiry which is briefly described. It is the model of inquiry presented by Merleau-Ponty whose comprehension will require the whole of this essay to lay the groundwork for. The apparatus is not mentioned again until the fourth section.  However it is the basic apparatus in terms of which the recognition of the Novum is comprehensible.

 

All of section I sets the stage for the inquiry undertaken in the rest of the essay.  This inquiry begins

in section II.

 

Section II

 

This section is, for the most part, concerned with what appears within the clearing-in-being and how that is ap­proached by contemporary philosophy.

 

Contemporary philosophy is considered to be comprised of four mutually related disciplines. 

 

These are:

 

Ontology

Phenomenology

Hermeneutics

Dialectics

 

The fourfold structure of these disciplines are related to the structure of the clearing-in-being itself in two ways.

 

First, it is related to the fourfold structure of the fundamental presupposition on which the clearing as a model is built.  This is the assumption named by M. Henry 'Ontological Monism'.  it is the presupposition that trans­cendence grounds itself.

 

Second, it is related to the structure of the clearing-in-being's involuted opposite formulation, called 'The Knot of Paradoxicality.  The clearing-in-being and the knot of paradoxicality are two views of a single phenomenon.  One view is as if from the inside while the other view is as if from the outside.  A knot of paradoxicality is any vicious circle or infinite regress in which a visual or logical paradox or contradiction is generated.  The logical structure that binds or sets up a paradox is discovered to be fourfold. Both of these bases for the fourfold structure of the philosophical disciplines are related to an even deeper problematic which is discovered to be fundamental to all philosophy.  This may be expressed as the tension between two similar (or mutually corresponding) philosophical motifs; Sameness and transcendence (that is, identity and difference).

 

All thought ultimately is channeled toward the con­sideration of this basic philosophical problem and locks-in on it.  Thought about it naturally gives rise to a four­fold conceptual model, which arises in many forms in differ­ent contexts.  The forms that are considered in this paper are the following:

 

1.  Four Philosophical Disciplines

(i.e. the form it takes in relation to the clearing-in-being)

 

2.  Fourfold Structure of the Presupposition of Ontological Monism

(i.e. the form it takes in relation to the basic presupposition which underlies the model of the clearing in being and knot of paradoxicality)

 

3. Fourfold structure which Binds the Knot of Paradoxicality

 

4.  The Four States of Being

(to be considered momentarily)

 

Section two begins in Part A by stating the problematic of the two basic philosophical motifs, then in Part B it introduces and explores in depth one of the forms this problematic takes in philosophy - that is the form of the presupposition of ontological monism.  In Parts C, D, & E the form that the problematic takes in relation to the clearing-in-being which gives rise to the four philosophical disciplines is explored.  Parts F & G expand upon certain themes that come to light concerning the exposition of the philosophical disciplines.  Part H considers the relation between the two motifs and the manifestation of the clearing-in-being in the guise of the knot of paradoxicality.

 

In section two, the problematic of the relation between the two motifs (sameness/transcendence) is pushed back further into a realm which is deeper than it is usually taken in current philosophical practice.  That is this problematic points to the revitalization of our concept of oneness.

 

The concept of oneness (generally neglected by contemporary philosophy) is used as a measure for the problematic of sameness/transcendence.  This is done by distinguishing several different conceptions of oneness (after Plato?) and then applying them to the situation in which the 'problematic' of the motifs arises.  This situation may be termed 'ideational'.  That is to say the problematic arises when ideation begins.

 

The icon of Oneness 'as a unity in difference of being' (of Blum Theorizing 2.1) is called 'The Four States of Being'. It is noted that precisely because of the entry into the zone of the problematic of sameness/transcendence by modern ontology, several qualitatively different conceptions of being have appeared.  These are as follows:

 

Descartes, Kant, Husserl     1.  Being as Pure Presence

 

This comprehensive icon is then identified with the clearing-of- being by the argument that taken together these four states of being all cancel with each other leaving no remainder.

 

Thus the Concept of a clearing-of -being is given meta-physical grounding and a precise ontological formulation. This fourfold structure as with the others flows from the natural conceptual pattern which arises when thought approaches the problematic of the two motifs.  The precise workings of the model of the four states of being is explored in section IV. However in this section the argument is further augmented by showing how the four states give rise to two subsidiary models which have been predominant in different periods of western philosophy.  One model is stated in terms of essential types of transcendence and was developed in the philosophies of Kant and Husserl, while the other subsidiary model is stated in terms of modalities and is being worked out by Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty

 

 

In sections two and three, I attempt to show the concrete implications of the four states of being for metaphysics by showing how it gives rise to these two subsidiary models of transcendence.  And then, how the shift from one of these to the other came about as a crucial feature in modern philosophical history.  In order to do this it was neces­sary to trace to its logical conclusion the trend of finding' different modalities by showing the existence of a fourth one to complement those already 'discovered' by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.  Then the two models are shown to be merely different versions of the same thing, which is the icon of the four states of being.  Thus the epistemological dimensions of modern metaphysics which explores different models of transcendence is traced back to the arguments of modern ontology.

 

In light of the appearance of the four states of being, the fundamental presupposition of western metaphysics -i.e. ontological monism is challenged (i.e. by M. Henry). Thus a fundamental transformation exists between the realm in which this presupposition is operative and one, which questions it (i.e. ontological dualism).  This transformation has an effect on the four philosophical disciplines, which have a different nature and object inside and outside that realm.  Also this transformation is seen to be isometric with the actual involution of the clearing-in-being into the knot of paradox.  Thus the four disciplines of philosophy within the realm of the presupposition of ontological monism are displayed as a basis for a description of their ‘doubles’, which become effective outside that realm.

 

 

 

 

 

The change in the nature of the four disciplines, the change in fundamental presupposition, and the change from stating epistemological arguments in terms of types of transcendence to sorts of modalities are all seen as analogous to the involuting of the Clearing-in-being into the Knot of paradoxicality.  This transformation is controlled by and based on a single ontological model prescribed by the four states of being.  This ontological

10

 

model calls our attention to the lost concept of oneness which in turn calls our attention to the necessity of the clearing-of-being to balance the involuting of the clearing-in-being into the knot of paradoxicality.

 

This provides the basic perspective within which the unfolding of section two must be viewed.

 

Part A  Sameness / Transcendence

 

This part of section two is introductory and connective. It introduces the major themes and provides a link with section one.  It begins by defining the clearing-of-being in terms of the states of being and the concept of oneness (as difference in unity of being).  The concept of oneness is defined explicitly by A. Blum but he does not pursue its definition in terms of states of being, except obliquely.

 

The clearing of being is then defined in relation to Heidegger's concept of the clearing in being.  It is then considered what kind of inquiry can approach the clearing of being.  At this point inquiry is divided into two sorts: Circular and linear and these are then again contrast to a third kind which 'refuses movement'.  The former pair are identified with transcendence while the later one is identified with the motif of sameness.  It is this latter kind of inquiry which has been named in the foregoing 'The Query'.  It refuses to leave the abode of thought but only seeks to make it more its own.  In this way the two motifs of sameness and transcendence are introduced.  This is then given mythological underpinning by a reference to Plato's

'First law of Zeus'.

 

Once the two motifs have been defined it is shown that a fundamental feature of thought is that at a certain point the motif of sameness transforms into the motif of trans­cendence.  This bursting of sameness into transcendence immediately articulates the universe of discourse.  This articulation is expressed in the arising of four archetypal philosophical disciplines.  Of these disciplines symbolically represent each of the fundamental motifs. Heidegger in Being and Time gives a definition of philosophy in terms of these four disciplines.

 

Ontology - Phenomenology ==  Transcendence

 

Hermeneutics – Dialectics   ==  Sameness

                          Analytics

 

However it is noted how his definition suppresses one of the disciplines and replaces it with a watered down simulacrum (i.e. analytics is substituted for dialectics). The implications of this for Being and Time are discussed along with the difference between analytics and dialectics. In effect Heidegger fails to use his own insights in the theoretical structuring of his presentation of them.  This suppression is seen as a means of preventing the arising of any more modalities that the two Heidegger discusses in Being and Time.  Thus the problem of the proliferation of different modalities of action in contemporary philosophy is introduced.

 

 

Part B Ontological Monism

 

In this part of the second section a major theme is intro­duced and discussed in detail.  The framework for the dis­cussion is a detailed commentary upon a central section of M. Henry's book The Essence of Manifestation in which the concept was first introduced.

 

The conceptions given by Henry are then applied to the model of the clearing-in-being and illustrated by examples from Hiedegger's later thought and from the work of Derrida.

 

A detailed analysis of the components of the presupposition of ontological monism is followed closely.  It is seen how these components take on a certain pattern of inter relationship.  This pattern has four segments.  The extra­polation follows that it is necessary, for the argument to appear that it take on a special four part form.  Thus the theoretical argument concerning appearance has to fulfill certain requirements in order to appear itself.  It is noticed that these requirements involve a specific inter-relation of four elements.  Thus one of the major propo­sitions upon which the rest of the essay is founded is that there is a threshold of minimal complexity which must be passed for an object of thought to appear to theoretical

sight. Once, this points has been established then two crucial concepts are added to it.

 

1.          Laying the foundations

2.          Fundamental indeterminacy

 

Thought attempts to 'lay the foundations' to provide itself with a solid ground as a thrust against the fundamental indeterminacy of those grounds.  'Laying the foundations' amounts to the attempt to unify the four elements of the minimal system of four segments while the fundamental indeterminacy shows up as interferences which are generated by the insubstantial grounds of thought which prevent such a unification.  This impossibility of absolute clarification defines the limits of thought.

 

As the result of thought's inability to ground itself the concept of nihilism is, at this point, introduced.  This  appears in practical terms as a feature of the minimal system called minimal change - that is the constant generation of  'background noise' which is necessary as a backdrop of the appearance of anything.  This background motion (irregular non-random) gets incorporated as a component into the conceptual system itself.  Also, certain theoreticians attempt to dominate and remove it.

 

Also a major feature of the minimal system is that it is at the threshold of its appearance that inside/outside may be first distinguished and directionality appears (a major indication of inquiry's separation from the query). By means of these two features the minimal system points toward the threshold upon which it appears.  This threshold itself does not appear and is thus called subliminal.

 

A brief excursion into Husserl's philosophy is then used as a means of solidifying the results of this part of section two.  Given this philosophical situation in which thought tries and fails to lay the foundations through which certain patterns of theorizing arise, it is necessary to find a means of measuring our own immersion in the situation. The one means at hand even though it has been abandoned by modern philosophy is the concept of oneness.  Thus at the end of this part I go back to Plato's different definitions of the kinds of response to this philosophical situation as a basis for discovering the different definitions of one­ness that must be invoked to understand the situation.  This leads to an exposition of the concept of being or Parmenides, and the Stranger of Elea’s proof of the existence of non-being.\

 

In this way a positive definition of the situation is formulated that accounts for its constant shifting and indeterminacy.  So here the concept of the non-nihilistic basis of nihilism is breached for the first time.  The nihilistic situation of indeterminacy has a positive effect.

 

1.          It provides the background "noise" that is neces­sary for anything to appear

 

2.          In its constant change it is continually indi­cating oneness that lies beyond the flux.

 

 

Part C  Phenomenology/Ontology

 

With this part begins the in-depth study of the four philosophical disciplines as they appear in the articulation of the universe qf discourse of modern philosophy.  Phenomenology and ontology are the reciprocally related icons of the motif of transcendence in modern philosophy.  By them we are led to a concrete discussion of 'laying the foundations' (the fundamental act of grounding transcendence) in terms of Kants attempt to ^do just that. Kant’s formulation of the problem of laying the foundations is 'read off' by way of Heidegger's interpretation.

 

Part D Hermeneutics

 

First hermeneutics is seen in the context of the phenomenology / ontology reciprocality.  Then another major theme is introduced.  This is the concept of manifold.  This con­cept is defined in terms of Kant's philosophy and especially the project of laying the foundations.  Also the manifold is laid out as the context of the minimal system.  By means of the manifold the interpretation of the minimal system is made possible.

 

Once the context of interrelation has been defined then a precise exploration of what is meant by the term in modern ontology is undertaken by means of an exegesis of the relevant text from Being and Time.

 

This leads to an understanding of the meaning of semiotics in the context of modern philosophy.

 

Part E Dialectics

 

Hermeneutics transforms itself into dialectics by the consideration of the effect on it of time. The concept of dialectics is explored in detail using Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason as the point of departure. Then its further connection to the concept of structure is unearthed perhaps for the first time. This leads to the positing of a model of the complex system of signs which appears in the clearing-in-being. By this model it is shown that open and closed systems are merely two aspects of the same thing. By the laying out of the model of the semiotic system we come to the end of the search for what lies within the clearing-in-being which it has been the principle aim of this section to bring out.

 

Part F Foucault's Order of Things

 

Having thus laid out the semiotic system it is only left to understand its development within the clearing-in-being.  In order to do this a long detailed exegesis of Foucault's book is given in terms of the minimal systems development into the semiotic system.  In this way the principles of hermeneutics and dialectics put forward earlier are shown their efficacy, and Foucault's book is interpreted from a perspective which might be unexpected.

 

By this interpretation a first approach toward an understanding of ideation is made, its foundation in mnemonics, and its dependence on the manifold.

 

Part G Zolla: Oneness as an idea

 

Since oneness was used as our measure of ideation, it is only natural to concentrate next on a text which takes the idea of oneness as its object. Unexpected results also follow from this interpretation.

 

Part H Knot of Paradoxicality

 

This part serves to reiterate in a different context

many of the foregoing themes.  The clearing-in-being turned inside out and seen from the outside is a knot of paradoxicality. At the end some suggestions are made concerning the trans­formations of the four disciplines outside the realm of ontological monism.

 

Section III

 

Having explored the landscape of the clearing-in-being in detail discovering its major features (i.e. the minimal system and its expansion into the full semiotic system) and postulating a model of its limits (i.e. the manifold); it is possible to turn our attention now to the most important feature of the clearing-in-being. This is called among other names the "Boundary". The boundary is not just the threshold of appearance but is its idealization.  It is the threshold of the appearance of ideas. As such it does not lie within the clearing nor at its limits described by the model .of the manifold.  In fact its precise location is taken as a problematic.  It is effervescent and must be approached in such a way as to catch a glimpse of it with­out reifying it conceptually. A great deal of this section is devoted to catching a glimpse of the boundary.  Another major theme of this section is what is called the Heidegger illusion. This is the name given to Heidegger's attempted solution to the 'problem of transcendence' by an appeal to modality. The development of the universe of discourse of philosophy which allowed such an attempt (that set it up as a problem to be solved), is one of the most interesting developments in the history of philosophy. The roots of the Heidegger illusion is traced back through Husserl to the original setting up of the universe of discourse in which transcendence is a problem by Kant.

 

A third major theme is the transformation of the sameness/transcendence motifs into skepticism / nihilism. That is from a vague philosophical problem into an existential situation. 

 

The fourth theme is the further development of the concept of the manifold and its explanation using a suitable thought icon. That is the icon of dimensionality by which the relationship between the 'manifold' and the concept of oneness is explored in depth.

 

These four major themes are woven together to form the substance of section three, part A attempts to set the stage for a first approach toward the boundary by con­trasting two philosophers encounters with the groundlessness of thought. These philosophies are those of Descartes and Heidegger. They are discovered to be reciprocally related in many ways. An attempt is made to glimpse the boundary between their two approaches toward it.  In Part B a second attempt to glimpse the boundary but this time instead of from between two philosophers it is from between two outcast philosophical positions, those of skepticism and nihilism. With Part C a third more complex and longer approach to glimpsing the boundary is begun which will encompass the rest of the section. This approach begins by an in depth look at Husserl's philosophy. That philosophy can be seen to have two major models which form its backbone. The first is a model of transcendence - in the forerunner of the model presented by Heidegger and jasper - is it called Husserl's "Motif". The second is the several essential types of transcendence by which he elaborates that model progressively in the Logica1 Investigations.  In this part of the paper I pre-sent the cores   of both models.  Part D is then a radical attempt to step back to the origin from which the whole problematic set up by these two models arises.  In it the idea of oneness is given an interpretation stemming from my own study of oriental philosophy. The idea of oneness is interpreted as interpenetration.

 

Interpenetration means every speck of the dust of creation contains within it all of creation in reflection. This concept is then connected to the setting up of the uni­verse of discourse of modern philosophy by Kant with his distinction between infinite and finite knowledge. Then a concrete thought icon taken from the western tradition is developed which ties together the manifold and the idea of oneness as interpenetration. Part E develops this synthesis of themes by giving the idea of the manifold a relativistic (cf Einstein) interpretation.  By looking at it in terms of space/time its connection to the form of the idea, the Husserl motif and certain themes developed by Merleau-Ponty becomes apparent,  Part F remains unwritten but if  completed it would specifically show how Heidegger's philosophical illusion was rooted in Husserls Logical Investigations.  This is an important exploration of a crucial stage in the unfolding of the universe of dis­course of modern philosophy,  At this transition point the essence of the whole tradition may be glimpsed.  For there^ Heidegger attempts to solve the problematic set in motion by Kant which he in turn took from scholastic philosophy. Part G is a deep exegesis of the architectonic of^ Kant's philosophy revealing the sub-structure of the boundary which is called the limit of reversibility.  the uni­verse of discourse set up by Kant unfolds, the assumptions originally packed into it by Kant which were not noticeable in his own time become important.  Many themes in Merleau-Ponty's exploration of the sub-structure of the idea are revealed by a detailed study of Kant's original posting of the universe of discourse in the Critique of Pure Reason. By comparing these two end points important - not easily discerned-aspects of ideation become apparent.  By means of     these it is possible to give a final definition to the boundary and glimpse its structure.

 

In the whole of section III an allusion is made to a further theme which will only properly be developed in the next section.  This is the concept of intra-penetration as a balance to inter-penetration.  Because oneness is here  still only an idea it must conform to the form of ideational processes.  By means of this further concept we are led back to an even deeper study of the concept of nihilism which takes place in the next section.

 

Part A  Two philosophical encounters with groundlessness.

 

In this section two different philosophies, those of Descartes and Heidegger are appraised in terms of their approaches to groundlessness. To Descartes groundlessness appears primarily as oblivion. Therefore it is the primary objective of the first segment of this part to uncover the model of the sphere of oblivion with a droplet of oblivion in the centre. Kant takes this model over from Descartes and makes it the basis of his philosophy by applying the idea of infinity to it. And it is also this model which eventually is turned into the clearing-in-being / knot of paradoxicality and which finally is transformed into the manifold by which the absolute limits of the clearing-in-being is defined.

 

Because groundlessness appears as oblivion to Descartes then anamasis becomes the basic movement of his philosophy. All philosophies may be classified according to whether anamasis plays a central role or not.  For all the great ones its role is vital. Thus it is for both Heidegger and Descartes.  Since groundlessness first appears as forgetfulness it is a major theme of this section and indeed in the whole of the rough draft to show the importance of its opposite i.e. memory as re-collection.

 

The segment concerning Descartes ends in a hermeneutic exploration of Descartes famous dream in which the seed of his "admirable science" was revealed to him. The substance of that dream is taken to substantiate the interpretation given to his 'meditations' in this part.

 

Next the theory of recollection as it appears in Heidegger's own philosophy is explored. Thus a depth exegesis of the section of Being and Time on the call of conscience is made. This also reveals Heidegger's stance toward groundlessness although he does not conceive of it as oblivion but instead as 'nothing'-ness. This gives a context for the exploration of the meaning of Dasein.

 

Continually throughout the part comparison is made between the approaches of these two philosophies to groundlessness. Neither approach is taken to be definitive. Rather groundlessness takes on different qualities through different approaches to it. This is shown at the end of Part A when a completely different approach is displayed based on the form of the axiomatic platform. Part B skepticism, Nihilism and Death

 

In Part A the sameness/transcendence twinned motifs were presented in terms of the difference between philosophies of 're-collection' and those in which amanesis plays no central role.  In this part these same twin motifs are